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A Framework for Misuse Detection in
Ad Hoc Networks—Part I
Dhanant Subhadrabandhu, Member, IEEE, Saswati Sarkar, Member, IEEE, and Farooq Anjum
Abstract—We consider ad hoc networks with multiple, mobile
intruders. We investigate the placement of the intrusion detec-
tion modules for misuse-based detection strategy. Our goal is
to maximize the detection rate subject to limited availability of
communication and computational resources. We mathematically
formulate this problem, and show that computing the optimal
solution is NP-hard. Thereafter, we propose two approximation al-
gorithms that approximate the optimal solution within a constant
factor, and prove that they attain the best possible approximation
ratios. The approximation algorithms though require recomputa-
tion every time the topology changes. Thereafter, we modify these
algorithms to adapt seamlessly to topological changes. We obtain
analytical expressions to quantify the resource consumption versus
detection rate tradeoffs for different algorithms. Using analysis
and simulation, we evaluate these algorithms, and identify the
appropriate algorithms for different detection rate and resource
consumption tradeoffs.
Index Terms—Ad hoc networks, distributed algorithms, opti-
mization, resource management, site security monitoring.
I. INTRODUCTION
AD HOC NETWORKS provide the only means ofelectronic communication in areas where establishing
infrastructure like base stations is either impossible or not cost-
effective. Examples include disaster recovery operations, bat-
tlefields, communication in remote terrains (e.g., reservations
and rural areas), events like superbowl matches, etc., These
networks are used by a diverse user population, e.g., civilians
in disaster hit areas, spectators in superbowl matches etc.,
which increases the security risks. One such risk is a user who
subverts the functioning of the network by causing undesirable
events. Such users are considered as intruders and the events as
intrusions. Examples of intrusions are attacks such as TCP SYN
flood,1 Land Exploit,2 and SSPing3 [6], [7]. These intrusions
leverage system vulnerabilities. There are two ways to prevent
such intrusions. One way is to remove the vulnerabilities from
the system such as by designing resistant protocols like stream
control transmission protocol (SCTP) [23] to resist TCP SYN
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1The attacker opens a large number of half-open TCP connections.
2The attacker sends a TCP SYN packet with the same target and source ad-
dress
3The attacker sends a series of fragmented, oversized ICMP packets, etc.
flood attacks, patching the operating systems, etc. But, this may
not be possible due to various reasons such as poor design [17],
limited use of efficient technical solutions [e.g., SCTP is rarely
used due to large scale deployment of transmission control
protocol (TCP)], different devices having different capabilities,
inefficient configuration (e.g., users do not change default secu-
rity settings or apply patches), etc. The second approach, which
is complimentary to the first, is to detect attempts to leverage
the vulnerabilities and stop such attempts from succeeding. We
focus on the detection aspect of the second approach. We refer
to this as intrusion detection.
Intrusion detection has been extensively investigated for
wireline networks [8], [9]. But techniques geared toward wire-
line networks would not suffice in an ad hoc network due to
mobility, the ease of listening to wireless transmissions, lack
of fixed infrastructure, etc. [11]. For example, several detection
strategies in wireline networks are based on the presence of
a small number of static gateways that route and, therefore,
monitor all traffic. But, ad hoc networks typically do not have
such choke points, and if such choke points exist, their locations
continuously change due to mobility. Also, intrusion may be
detected in wireline networks by detecting anomaly, i.e., by
comparing the current system behavior with that in absence of
intrusion. In ad hoc networks, however, normal behavior cannot
be accurately characterized, e.g., a node may transmit false
updates since the routing protocol is slow to converge and not
because it is malicious. Further, unlike in wireline networks,
nodes in an ad hoc network have limited energy. Hence, only
computationally simple, energy-efficient detection strategies
can be used. The detection algorithms must also be distributed
as communication with a central computing unit will consume
significant energy and bandwidth. Finally, the detection al-
gorithms must seamlessly adapt to topological changes due
to mobility. These motivate the design of detection strategies
specifically geared toward ad hoc networks.
A strategy specifically suitable for ad hoc networks is that
of misuse detection that relies on the use of known patterns of
unauthorized behavior. This technique detects intrusion when
the transmitted traffic contains abnormal packets which serve
as “signatures” of attacks. For example, a user datagram pro-
tocol (UDP) packet destined to port 0 can crash some machines
[7]. The signature of ping-of-death attack is a very large ping
packet, that of RPC locator attack is a packet intended for port
135 that contains a command that the system is not expecting,
that of Bubonic attack are various values such as time-to-live
(TTL) of 255, type-of-service (TOS) field value of , ex-
actly 20 byte payload in the Internet protocol (IP) datagram and
the fragment ID value with consistent increments of 256 [7].
0733-8716/$20.00 © 2006 IEEE
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Due to low false alarm rates, misuse detection is the mainstay of
current commercial intrusion detection systems in wireline net-
works and wireless local area networks. This technique cannot
however detect new attacks, i.e., the attacks whose signatures
are unknown. Nevertheless, it is the most suitable technique in
ad hoc networks given that it does not require characterization
of normal behavior.
But a prerequisite for deploying misuse detection in ad
hoc networks is to determine which nodes should execute the
sniffing and analysis software modules which we refer to as
the intrusion detection system (IDS) modules. We show that
different selection strategies can have significantly different
detection efficiency and execution costs (Section II). It is,
therefore, crucial to deploy appropriate selection strategies that
attain the desired tradeoff. We mathematically formulate the
problem of selecting the nodes so as to maximize the detection
rate subject to not consuming more than a predetermined
amount of resource (Section III-A). We prove that computing
the optimal selection strategy is an NP-hard problem. Then, we
present polynomial complexity approximation algorithms that
attain constant factor approximation bounds (Section III-B).
These algorithms, however, require recomputation every time
the topology changes. Hence, we next propose heuristics that
adapt seamlessly to topological changes (Section III-C). We
evaluate the proposed algorithms using mathematical anal-
ysis and simulations (Section IV). In Section V, we describe
the relevant literature. We prove the analytical results in the
Appendix.
The characterization of the optimal selection strategy allows
us to identify the appropriate selection strategy for realizing
desired tradeoffs between detection efficiency and resource
consumption. Our investigation reveals that the approximation
algorithms consume significantly lower resource as compared
with heuristics when high detection rate is necessary and, thus,
must be deployed in this case. But, when the system can tolerate
certain amount of intrusion and, therefore, the detection rate
can be small, the heuristics and the approximately optimal
strategies consume similar resource. Thus, heuristics may be
deployed in these scenarios. We develop analytical expressions
that quantify the resource consumed by different selection
strategies for any given detection rate. These expressions can,
therefore, be used to decide which algorithm to deploy given
the operating conditions. We also observe that the optimal
algorithm detects all malicious packets by executing the IDS
in a modest fraction of the nodes, even though it is oblivious
toward the locations and identities of the intruders and the
paths used by them. This is an encouraging outcome as in most
ad hoc networks at least a small number of nodes will have
significant energy. Thus, it would be sufficient to execute the
IDS in only these nodes.
II. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we describe our system assumptions.
We first postulate that ad hoc networks in near future will
consist of two classes of nodes: 1) nodes that both communi-
cate using the network and perform system tasks like relaying
packets, discovering routes, securing communication, etc., (in-
sider nodes) and 2) nodes that only communicate using the net-
work (outsider nodes). Our postulate is based on the observa-
tion that providing the desired quality-of-service (QoS) to users
is a prerequisite for large-scale use of this technology. But, if
the network is to provide any QoS guarantee it can utilize the
users but cannot solely rely on them. This is because users may
be available for short durations only. The QoS guarantees can,
however, be provided if some easily deployable low complexity
system nodes, e.g., static and mobile access points are available.
These nodes together with users who are trusted by the network
and are in the network most of the time can be relied upon for
performing system tasks. Such system nodes and trusted users,
therefore, constitute the insiders. The remaining nodes are the
outsiders.
We now provide several example wireless networks that con-
sist of insiders and outsiders. During an event which is widely
attended and lasts for short time, e.g., a superbowl match, ser-
vice providers may augment the connectivity and coverage pro-
vided by the existing cellular and/or Wi-Fi networks by utilizing
additional static and mobile access points and the terminals of
trusted users [13]. Here, the static and mobile access points,
as well as the trusted users constitute insider nodes. The re-
maining users who only communicate using the network are the
outsiders. Mesh networks also consist of insiders (mesh points)
and outsiders (users). In future, such networks may utilize some
trusted users to perform system tasks, particularly during service
outage due to failure of existing mesh points, or sudden and tem-
porary increase in service demand in specific areas (temporary
hotspots)—such users would also constitute insiders. Finally, a
disaster recovery team can use ad hoc networks to provide ser-
vices like e-mail, news, audio/video applications, etc., in an area
where communication infrastructure has been damaged due to
a natural disaster or terrorist activity. The insider nodes are ac-
cess points on buildings and mobile terminals carried by the per-
sonnel. The outsider nodes are civilians who communicate using
the network.
All the above examples, and more generally the wireless net-
works with insiders and outsiders, retain the essential character-
istics of ad hoc networks. These networks use multihop wireless
communication, as source-destination paths may involve sev-
eral insiders who relay messages using wireless links. Nodes in
such networks, outsiders and also insiders, may be small mo-
bile terminals and may have limited energy and memory, e.g.,
access points, laptops, personal digital assistants (PDAs) (in-
sider nodes) carried by members of a disaster recovery team
and trusted users. Static access points in some existing ad hoc
networks in rural areas also have limited energy [4]. Finally,
the set of insiders may change with time. For example, the net-
work provider will need to provide incentive in lieu of service
to the users who serve as insiders and, hence, may utilize such
users only as required, e.g., in hotspots or when existing access
points fail. We focus on detecting intrusion in these ad hoc net-
works. Note that these networks are significantly different from
cellular networks where only the last hop is a wireless link,
and only the nodes that use the network are mobile, dynamic
and have limited energy and memory, while the set of nodes
(base-stations) that perform system tasks remain the same, do
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Fig. 1. This figure illustrates the system model. The outsiders nodes (Intruder1, Intruder2) attack the destinations (1,2). The insider nodes are the access points,
mobile terminals and laptops (B, D, E). If access point (2) is IDS active, it can hear the transmission from A, B, and C and, hence, the attacks are detected.
not change locations and have practically unlimited energy and
memory.
We now describe the security risks. An outsider may wish to
deliver malicious (bad) packets to the destination, which may be
an insider or an outsider, resulting in malfunction or failure of
the destination. An outsider that sends bad packets is referred to
as an intruder. A packet that is not bad is referred to as good. The
network may have multiple intruders. The number and location
of the intruders, their destinations and the paths used by them
are not known to the network.
Intrusion can be detected if the destinations of the sessions
(e.g., destinations 1, 2 in Fig. 1) execute the IDS modules (host
intrusion detection or HID) [15]. Here, a node executes the
IDS at its application layer, and can therefore, analyze only the
packets it receives as destination, and not those that it relays.
The advantage of HID is that it is not affected by the use of
end-to-end cryptography or by changes in topology and routing
that may be triggered by node mobility. But HID has several
serious drawbacks. First, an intruder can avoid detection and
produce maximum damage by exploiting the knowledge that
only the destination analyzes the packets. For example, if the in-
truder knows that the destination is using a particular version of
Windows 2000 operating system, then it can transmit a packet
that crashes the machine as soon as the destination’s network
layer assembles the packet and before the IDS at the application
layer analyzes the packet [2]. Second, the detection mechanism
will use the computation resources and network interfaces at
the end-host. But, an attack on the target may simultaneously
exhaust the resources available for detecting and reporting such
attacks. Third, many of the destination nodes may not be able to
execute the IDS due to limited computational resource and low
residual energy. Finally, if only the end-hosts execute the IDS,
then the bad packets would not be dropped until they reach the
destination. Thus, several nodes expend their limited energy
and available bandwidth in relaying bad packets.
The network intrusion detection (NID) technique [15] exe-
cutes the IDS on some selected insider nodes, e.g., the access
point(2) in Fig. 1, which may be a relay or an end-host. Here,
a node executes the IDS at its network layer, and can therefore,
analyze both the packets it relays and receives as destination. In
ad hoc networks, NID has several advantages over HID. First, an
intruder can no longer be certain that only the destination is ex-
ecuting the IDS. Moreover, the nodes that execute the IDS can
be selected so that they have different characteristics. Thus, it
will be more difficult for the intruders to devise attacks that are
not detected. Second, these nodes can be selected only among
those that have the required capability. Third, NID captures bad
packets in transit and, thus, limits the wastage of bandwidth
and energy in relaying them. Finally, the nodes that execute
IDS can also analyze encrypted traffic when encryption is not at
the network layer. For example, when traffic is encrypted at the
application layer, IDS modules can detect attacks at transport
and lower layers, e.g., ping-of-death, TCP SYN flood, smurf,
bubonic, etc., If encryption is used at all layers, e.g., in battle-
field networks, then schemes can be designed to distribute the
keys securely to the nodes that execute the IDS. Investigation of
key distribution schemes is beyond the scope of this paper. We
consider NID in this paper.
Summarizing, some selected insider nodes execute the IDS
modules so as to detect bad packets while in transit between the
intruder and its destination—these are denoted as IDS active.
Some insiders may not have the capability to execute the IDS.
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Thus, insiders are of two types: 1) IDS capable and 2) IDS
incapable. Let be the set of IDS capable insiders. Only
IDS capable insiders can become IDS active. The set of IDS
active insiders changes with time since the selection depends
on the topology. We assume that insider nodes are not compro-
mised. Authentication mechanisms prevent an outsider from
masquerading as an insider.
We now examine the tradeoffs associated with different
selection strategies. A straightforward strategy is to execute
the IDS on every IDS capable insider. Thus, every bad packet
will be detected. But, the number of insiders is expected to be
large. This is because of two reasons. First, since only insiders
can relay packets, the insiders must constitute a nonnegligible
fraction of the total number of nodes in order to guarantee
end-to-end connectivity and provide the desired throughput
[25], and future networks will have a large number of nodes.
Finally, executing IDS consumes significant resources like
energy, memory and CPU cycles at each insider, and the in-
siders have limited resource. Thus, the straightforward strategy
significantly increases the resource consumption in the system.
On the other hand, if the IDS are executed in very few in-
siders, then the resource consumption decreases but some bad
packets may escape inspection leading to undetected intrusion.
The challenge is to select the IDS active insiders so that the
maximum possible number of packets are analyzed subject to
consuming no more than a given amount of resource.
We represent a wireless network by an undirected graph
. Here, consists of the insiders and
is the set of edges between the insiders. There exists an
undirected edge between any two insiders that can receive
transmissions from each other. We assume that every insider
can receive its own transmission and, hence, has an edge to
itself.
Definition 1: A neighborhood of an insider node is the
set of insiders that have edges from . An insider covers every
insider in its neighborhood. Let be the set of IDS capable
neighbors of an insider .
By this definition, an insider is always its own neighbor and
covers itself.
An IDS active insider node operates in promiscuous mode,
i.e., receives and analyzes any packet that is transmitted by any
of its neighbors. For example, in Fig. 1, if access point(2) is
IDS active and operates in promiscuous mode, it can analyze
the packets transmitted by nodes A, B, and C. Clearly, opera-
tion in promiscuous mode increases the power consumption of
these nodes. But, if no IDS active insider operates in promis-
cuous mode, then either a large number of insiders will need
to execute the IDS, or several bad packets will not be captured.
Our analysis and simulations demonstrate that the algorithms
we propose attain high detection rate while executing the IDS
in a modest fraction of the insiders; thus, the operation of a small
number of insiders in promiscuous mode consumes much less
energy than executing the IDS in several insiders.
An attack may consist of a single packet (e.g., Code Red and
Slammer [7]) or multiple packets (e.g., jolt2 or bubonic attacks).
We consider an attack to be detected when an IDS active insider
analyzes all the packets that constitute the attack. In our anal-
ysis, we assume that all packets constituting an attack traverse
the same path. In this case, an IDS active insider analyzes all
packets in an attack, if and only if it analyzes one packet in the
attack. Therefore, without loss of generality, in the analysis we
assume that each attack consists of a single packet. In our sim-
ulations, we consider attacks with multiple packets and investi-
gate the impact of path changes. Note that when insiders aggre-
gate each others analysis, then an intrusion can be detected even
when different IDS active insiders examine different packets of
the same attack. But such aggregation requires significant mes-
sage exchanges and increases the complexity and the resource
consumed in the detection [20], [29]. The design of efficient
schemes for complete or partial aggregation is a topic of fu-
ture research. We, therefore, do not assume the existence of such
schemes.
III. INTRUSION DETECTION IN PRESENCE OF
RESOURCE LIMITATION
We consider the problem of selecting the IDS active insiders
so as to maximize the detection efficiency subject to maintaining
resource consumption below the desired value. In Section III-A,
we motivate and subsequently mathematically formulate the de-
tection objective. We prove that this problem is NP-hard. In
Section III-B, we present a polynomial complexity algorithm
for approximating the optimal solution within a provable ap-
proximation bound. This algorithm is oblivious to the movement
of outsider nodes, but requires recomputation whenever insider
nodes move. In Section III-C, we present algorithms that do not
have provable approximation bounds, but nevertheless do not
require such recomputations and are, therefore, more suitable
when insider nodes move rapidly. All the algorithms proposed
in this section are oblivious toward locations, identities of the
intruders and the paths used by them.
A. Selecting the IDS Active Insiders for Maximizing
the Detection Efficiency Subject to Bounded Resource
Consumption
We consider the goal of selecting the IDS active insiders
among the IDS capable insiders such that the detection effi-
ciency is maximized subject to limiting the resource consumed
for detecting intrusion. We first quantify the resource consumed
by any selection strategy. We subsequently quantify the de-
tection efficiency of any selection strategy. We next formulate
the detection goal as an optimization problem and prove that
optimally selecting the IDS active insiders is NP-hard.
We first describe the resource consumed by each IDS active
insider. An IDS active insider needs to receive and analyze
all packets transmitted in its neighborhood. Thus, it needs to
constantly operate in active mode which consumes significant
energy. Next, traffic analysis is computationally intensive,
e.g., a P3 850 MHz laptop spent 10% CPU cycles to analyze
1.5 Mb/s [25]. The CPU usage of an IDS active insider increases
further with the increase in traffic transmitted in the insider’s
neighborhood. Finally, an IDS active insider must store the
traffic analysis module and the signature database; these occupy
significant part of its memory, e.g., in a Windows-based system,
a commonly used collection of signatures, Snort, consumes
256 MB of memory [3]. Furthermore, each IDS active insider
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consumes resource from the system, and introduces additional
system complexity. First, each IDS active insider needs to
regularly update the signatures by downloading them from
a central database which consumes bandwidth, energy, and
memory at all insiders in the path between and the database,
and the update frequency can be as much as once every 30
minutes [1]. Next, whenever an IDS active insider generates
a report to the security administrator or a neighboring node,
regarding an attack or lack thereof, it must authenticate itself.
Thus, these insiders must maintain and periodically update the
authentication keys; such updates consume communication
resources from other nodes. Finally, the IDS active insiders
may demand some incentives from the system, for agreeing to
perform the required tasks. Clearly, the total system resource
consumed in the detection process, which includes resource
consumed at the IDS active and the IDS inactive insiders and
the incentive demanded by the IDS active insiders increases
with increase in the number of the IDS active insiders. We,
therefore, consider the resource consumed by the selection
strategy as the number of IDS active insiders. Motivated by
the need to reserve a part of the network resources for other
functions, we impose the constraint that a detection strategy
should have at most IDS active insiders, where is a system
parameter.
We now quantify the detection efficiency of a selection
strategy. Since an IDS active insider detects bad packets trans-
mitted by its neighbors, all bad packets will be detected if all
intruders are covered by the IDS active insiders. This is difficult
to attain because the network has a large number of outsiders
and only a small fraction of these are intruders, and the network
does not know a priori the identity and the location of any
outsider; the number and location of the outsiders also change
rapidly. Now, note that all bad packets are relayed by insiders
except those that are directly transmitted from the intruders to
their target nodes. This is because only insiders relay packets.
Thus, the detection efficiency increases when the IDS active
insiders cover larger number of insiders. We consider the
detection efficiency of a strategy to be the number of insider
nodes covered by IDS active insiders.
Thus, our goal is to select the IDS active insider nodes among
the IDS capable insider nodes such that they cover the max-
imum possible number of insider nodes subject to constraining
the total number of the IDS active insider nodes to be upper
bounded by a constant . We refer to a selection algorithm that
attains the above objective as the optimal algorithm.
Lemma 1: Optimally selecting the IDS active insiders is an
NP-hard problem.
Proof: We first describe the maximum coverage problem
which is a well-known NP-hard problem ([10, Sec. 3.9]). There
exists a set with elements and subsets of
: . The maximum-coverage problem is to select
of these subsets so that the union of the selected subsets has
the maximum possible cardinality. Consider a wireless network
with IDS capable insiders and IDS incapable in-
siders . Thus, . Let
. Thus,
. Let the upper bound on the number of IDS active in-
siders be in this network. The optimal selection strategy se-
lects IDS capable insiders such that
. Note that for any
, , . Thus,
constitute the optimal solution for the maximum
coverage problem as well. Thus, if the optimal set of IDS active
insiders can be determined in polynomial complexity, then the
maximum coverage problem can also be solved in polynomial
complexity.
Lemma 1 also holds in the special case that all insiders are
IDS capable [25].
The optimal set of IDS active insiders can be computed
by solving an integer linear program, (maximize
detection subject to bounded resource consumption). For each
insider node there exists two integer variables: 1) and
2) . Now, indicates whether an IDS active node covers
, i.e., if an insider node in is IDS active, and 0,
otherwise. Also, if is IDS active, and 0, otherwise.
Thus, . Thus, since each is a nonneg-
ative integer, is either 0 or 1. The upper bound on resource
consumption introduces another constraint: .
The goal of is to maximize the number of insiders
covered by the IDS active insiders, i.e., subject to
these constraints.
Maximize:
subject to
1) , .
2) , .
3) , .
4) .
An integer linear program (ILP) can be solved in exponential
complexity, which is expected since the optimal selection is an
NP-hard problem.
We end this section with a few concluding remarks. First, in
Section IV, we quantify the probability of detection of an attack
under the optimal selection strategy. Next, the detection goal can
be generalized to accommodate a more general quantification of
the resource consumed by any selection strategy. We can assign
an IDS capable insider weight , and consider the resource
consumed by a selection strategy to be the sum of the weights
of all IDS active insiders. The goal now is to maximize the
detection efficiency subject to ensuring that the resource con-
sumed does not exceed . This generalization would allow us
to associate different importance with the resource consumed
by different insiders, e.g., laptops, PDAs, by assigning different
weights to different nodes, based on their residual energy and
computational capability. The above ILP can easily be gener-
alized to optimally select the IDS active insiders in this case;
the optimal selection problem continues to remain NP-hard. Our
simplification has been to assume that for all .
B. Algorithms for Approximating the Optimal Solution Within
Guaranteeable Approximation Bound
We now present two polynomial complexity algorithms
that approximately compute the optimal set of IDS active
insiders. The first algorithm, Greedy algorithm for maximum
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Fig. 2. Let n = 2 and let all insiders be IDS capable. Greedy-MC selects
insiders 5 and 1 in the first two iterations, respectively. Now, consider
MUNEN-MC. The node-selection phase continues for two iterations. In the
first iteration, insiders 5 and 1 are selected. In the second iteration, insider 9 is
selected. The select priorities of insiders 5; 1; 9 are 7; 5; 5, respectively. During
the node-retention phase, nodes 5 and 1 are retained.
coverage (Greedy-MC), has been adapted from a known ap-
proximation algorithm for the maximum coverage problem
in arbitrary graphs [10]. Greedy-MC attains the best possible
approximation ratio that can be attained by any polynomial
complexity algorithm, but requires several network-wide com-
munications; the number of these communications increase
with increase in values of system parameters. We next design
a polynomial complexity approximation algorithm “maximum
unsatisfied neighbors in extended neighborhood for maximum
coverage” (MUNEN-MC) that selects the same set of nodes
as Greedy-MC, but requires only a constant number of net-
work-wide communications [24].
We now describe Greedy-MC. We first introduce a new
notion.
Definition 2: The priority of an insider node is the number
of its neighbors that are not covered by any IDS active insider.
Greedy-MC iteratively selects the IDS active insiders. In each
iteration, it selects an IDS capable insider that has: 1) pos-
itive priority and 2) the maximum priority among all IDS ca-
pable insiders.4 After the selection, every insider in ’s two-hop
neighborhood recomputes its priority. The selection process ter-
minates either when all the IDS capable insiders have priority
0 or at the end of iterations, whichever occurs earlier. Thus,
Greedy-MC has complexity.
Fig. 2 elucidates the operation of Greedy-MC (and MUNEN-
MC).
Greedy-MC selects IDS active insiders among the IDS ca-
pable insiders such that (a) and (b) the IDS active in-
siders cover at least times that of the maximum
number of insiders covered by any IDS capable insiders. This
guarantee holds because Greedy-MC always selects an insider
in iteration such that the cardinality of the union
of the neighborhoods of all selected insiders is the maximum
possible given that the selection of the insiders in previous iter-
ations cannot be changed. Now, it is well known that the number
of elements in the union of subsets selected as above, from any
given collection of subsets, is at least times that
of the maximum number of elements in the union of any sub-
sets in the collection [10].
4If multiple IDS capable insiders have the maximum priority, Greedy-MC
selects the one with the least identity among them.
As Lemma 1 demonstrates, the optimal selection problem is
an instance of the maximum coverage problem. Unless
, the best possible approximation ratio for the maximum
coverage problem is . Specifically, unless ,
given an , it is possible to construct a collection of sub-
sets such that no polynomial complexity algorithm can be guar-
anteed to select among them such that the cardinality of the
union of the selected subsets exceeds times that of the
optimal selection [10]. Thus, is the best possible approx-
imation ratio for the selection problem. Now,
. Thus, Greedy-MC attains the best possible approxima-
tion ratio.
The problem with Greedy-MC is that before the selection of
each IDS active insider it needs network-wide communications
to determine which insider has the highest priority in the net-
work. Thus, it requires network-wide communications.
We design another polynomial complexity approximation
algorithm, MUNEN-MC that selects the same set of nodes
as Greedy-MC, but has significantly lower communication
complexity than Greedy-MC—MUNEN-MC requires only
three broadcasts, irrespective of .
We now describe MUNEN-MC. MUNEN-MC sequentially
executes the following two phases: 1) node-selection and
2) node-retention. During the node-selection phase, in each
iteration an IDS-capable insider selects itself if:
• has positive priority5;
• for any IDS capable insider in ’s two-hop neighbor-
hood, either 1) ’s priority is greater than that of or 2)
and have equal priority and .
At the end of each iteration (i.e., after the selections in the it-
eration), nodes recompute their priorities. The node-selection
phase continues for iterations, and is followed by the node-re-
tention phase.
We now describe the node-retention phase. We first define
the notion of “select-priority,” which is the priority of a node
selected during the node-selection phase just before it is se-
lected. During the node-retention phase, nodes with highest
select-priorities are retained; the rest of them are eliminated. If
two selected nodes have equal select-priorities, then the node
with lower identity is preferred. The nodes retained at the end
of this phase are selected as IDS active insiders.
Clearly, MUNEN-MC uses only local communication during
the node-selection phase. We now describe how a constant (3)
number of broadcasts can be used to discover which insiders
have the largest priorities. Some predetermined root insider
broadcasts a query packet along a spanning tree. The query
packet has tuples, and initially each tuple has value (0, 0).
Let be the insider with the least priority in the list. If insider
’s priority is higher than that of , or equal to that of and
, includes its identity and select-priority, and removes
the entry corresponding to . Finally, insiders at the leaves of
the spanning tree return the query packet toward the root which
rebroadcasts the query packet. Thus, every insider knows which
insiders would be retained.
5Once an insider selects itself, in all subsequent iterations it has 0 priority
and, hence, does not select itself again.
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Theorem 1: MUNEN-MC selects the same set of IDS active
insiders as Greedy-MC.
Thus, MUNEN-MC attains the best possible approximation
ratio as well.
The analysis and simulations demonstrate that when all in-
siders are IDS capable, both the optimal and approximation al-
gorithms attain very high probability of detection (close to 1).
This is remarkable since both these algorithms are oblivious to
the location and identity of the intruders and the paths used by
them.
C. Robust Heuristic Algorithms for Selecting the IDS Active
Insiders When Insider Nodes Move
The algorithms presented so far are oblivious to the position
of outsiders, and are therefore, not affected by their move-
ments. But, the IDS active set must be recomputed each time
an insider’s neighborhood changes due to its or its neighbors’
movements. Every such recomputation involves at least three
network-wide broadcasts. Thus, these algorithms cannot be
used when insider nodes move rapidly as then the recompu-
tations are frequent. We now present computationally simple
heuristic selection strategies that do not require any recompu-
tation with movement of either insider or outsider nodes, and
require only limited message exchange when insiders move.
The disadvantage is that the heuristics consume more resource
for attaining the same probability of detection as compared
with the optimal and approximation algorithms.
First, we consider a naive algorithm, random placement (RP),
in which every IDS capable insider executes the IDS with a
probability which can be selected so as to regulate the resource
consumed and detection probability. For example, if this proba-
bility is high, then a large number of insiders are IDS active.
Thus, the detection consumes a lot of resource but most bad
packets are detected.
We now propose another heuristic, which we refer to as
geometric dominating set algorithm (GO-DOM), that uses
geometric information to select the IDS active insiders (Fig. 3).
This heuristic can be used in topologies where all insiders
have equal transmission ranges, which we denote as . Thus,
two insiders are neighbors if and only if the distance between
them is less than or equal to . The network is covered by the
minimum possible number of circles each with radius . Each
IDS capable insider knows or computes the coordinates of the
centers of the circles. Note that this is a one time computation
or message exchange for each IDS capable insider. We assume
that each insider knows its coordinates (e.g., by using global
positioning system (GPS) or other existing techniques [5]). An
insider selects an IDS capable neighbor which is the nearest to
the center of a circle it currently resides in to execute the IDS
(an insider may select itself as well since by definition it is its
own neighbor). For this, each IDS capable insider broadcasts
its distance from the center of each circle it resides in to its
neighbors. It sends this broadcast packet when it joins the
system, and thereafter each time it moves.
GO-DOM detects all bad packets as it selects the IDS active
insiders so as to cover the entire network. We now generalize
Fig. 3. This figure illustrates the operation of GO-DOM. The circles in solid
lines are some of those that cover the geographic area of the network. For the
current positions of the nodes, 2 nodes in circle 3, v , v , execute the IDS. Both
v and v are the nearest in their neighborhoods to the center a of the circle they
reside in, i.e., circle 3. Now, v does not execute IDS as v in v ’s neighborhood
(the dashed circle) is nearer to a than v .
GO-DOM so as to select fewer IDS active insiders at the ex-
pense of obtaining lower detection rates. Now, each insider se-
lected by GO-DOM decides whether to execute the IDS with a
probability which can be selected so as to regulate the resource
consumed and detection rate. We refer to this version as gener-
alized geometric dominating set algorithm (GGO-DOM).
In Section IV, we compare the performances of the heuristics
with the optimal and approximation algorithms, and determine
when each may be deployed.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Using analysis and ns2-simulations, we compare the perfor-
mance of the optimal and approximation algorithms and the
computationally simple heuristics. This comparison allows us
to evaluate the benefits of (approximately) optimally selecting
the IDS active insiders, and accordingly decide the appropriate
algorithm for any desired tradeoff between detection probability
and resource consumption. We first obtain computationally
simple analytical expressions for the performance of the op-
timal algorithm (Section III-A) and RP in a network with static
insiders. Then, we simulate the performance of the approx-
imation algorithm and RP and compare the results obtained
from analysis and simulation. These comparisons validate both
the analysis and the simulations and also demonstrate that the
approximation and the optimal algorithms perform similarly.
Finally, in networks with mobile insiders, we compare the
performance of GGO-DOM and RP using simulations.
For each algorithm, we first analyze the probability of detec-
tion of bad packets at each insider. The analysis is exact for RP,
but provides bounds for the optimal algorithm. We then consider
the probability of detection of an attack when the bad packets
traverse arbitrary number of hops between the intruder and its
target. This generalization is complicated, and we obtain only
approximate results for both algorithms.
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We now describe the first analysis. We assume that static
insiders are uniformly distributed in a square of area . Each
insider is IDS capable. Now, we assume that an insider can re-
ceive transmissions from any node which is within a distance
from . Thus, the fraction of total area covered by an insider
is . We refer to this model as the “ ”
(“all insiders have equal transmission ranges, are IDS capable
and uniformly distributed in a square”) model. The optimal
algorithm executes IDS in insiders so as to maximize the
number of insiders covered by IDS active insiders. RP executes
IDS in each insider with probability (w.p.) . As discussed
before, without loss of generality, we assume that each attack
consists of a single bad packet. A bad packet is analyzed and,
hence, detected by an IDS active insider if it is relayed by at
least one neighbor of the insider. Depending on the value of
and , all insiders need not be covered by IDS active insiders
and, thus, all bad packets will not be detected. We compute the
probabilities of detection of the bad packets while being re-
layed by a uniformly selected insider for the optimal algorithm
and RP as functions of and
, respectively, for any given values of parameters , .
First, consider the simple case that . In this case, we can
ignore the “edge effects,” i.e., we assume that each insider’s cov-
erage area is within the overall area. Now, the probability that a
bad packet is not detected while being relayed by an insider
is the probability that none of ’s neighbors is IDS active; this
probability is . Thus
(1)
Now, (1) provides important insight about RP’s selection
strategy for different . Note that increases lin-
early with increase in the total area covered by the IDS active
insiders. When , this area is small. Now, since the IDS
active insiders are uniformly distributed under RP, and since
the uncovered area is more than the covered area, a new IDS
active insider is more likely to be selected in the uncovered
area. Thus, for low , RP selects the IDS active insiders such
that their coverage areas minimally overlap. Thus, the coverage
area should increase approximately by whenever a new IDS
active insider is added. Hence, should increase
linearly with increase in each of the variables , , when
the other two variables do not change. Consistent with this
intuition, it follows from (1) that:
(2)
Now, when is high, the IDS active insiders together cover a
large area. Now, since the IDS active insiders are uniformly dis-
tributed under RP and since the covered area is more than the
uncovered area, a new IDS active insider is more likely to be
selected in the covered area. Thus, RP selects the IDS active in-
siders such that their coverage areas significantly overlap and,
hence, the above linear approximation does not apply.
The following theorem relaxes the assumption that
and provides for arbitrary , , .
Theorem 2:
(3)
(4)
When the integrations are close to 1 and, thus, (4) reduces
to (1).
Note that it is difficult to compute because
of the dependence between the selection of the IDS active in-
siders and the topology. So, we obtain a stochastic upper bound
for . Given , , we compute this upper bound
by computing a lower bound for the minimum required to at-
tain a desired . We also obtain an approximation
which we intuitively argue as a lower bound for .
Using numerical computations, we would show that the bounds
are close to each other suggesting that both are good approxi-
mations for .
Theorem 3: Let be the tail probability of a bino-
mial distribution with parameters , , i.e.,
Let be the required probability of detection and let
. For any given , , with a probability of
at least the number of IDS active insiders, , required by
the optimal algorithm to attain exceeds
, where
We now consider another approximation for
which is computed assuming that every point in the square
under consideration is an insider. This resembles a network
with a large number of insiders. We refer to this assumption as
the model (all insiders have equal transmission
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ranges, are IDS-capable and densely distributed in a square).
We investigate the maximum possible probability of detection
when insiders execute IDS in such a network.
Note that does not depend on . Intuitively, in the
model, fewer insiders need to be covered using
IDS active insiders than in the model and, thus,
bad packets are detected with a higher probability in the former.
Thus, we expect . Computing
is again difficult as it requires the characterization
of the maximum possible area covered by discs of radius
in a square of area , which to the best of our knowledge, is
an open problem in mathematics. Asymptotic upper bounds
for this maximum possible area is, however, known [27]. We
could, however, lower bound for any , . This
provides a lower bound for .
Theorem 4: Let be an even integer
Theorem 4 shows that given , the lower bound on
is a piecewise linear function of . This happens because the
optimal algorithm selects the IDS active insiders such that their
coverage areas minimally overlap—this maximizes the detec-
tion probability. Thus, each additional IDS active insider in-
creases the coverage area and, hence, the detection probability
by similar amount. Refer to technical report [25] for the lower
bound for when is not an even integer.
We now compare the above analytical expressions with
measurements obtained using ns2-simulations. In our simula-
tions, we consider topologies with insiders distributed as per
the model with , , 0.1963
( , 150 m), . In each case, we consider
200 different trials. In each trial, an attack consisting of ten
packets is launched and a uniformly selected insider relays
the packet. The probability of detection is measured as the
percentage of trials in which the attack is detected, while the
bad packets are relayed by the selected insider; an attack is
detected if all packets constituting the attack are received by
an IDS active insider. Note that computing the optimal set of
IDS active insiders for requires substantial time,
which is expected given that the optimal selection problem
is NP-hard. Thus, for the simulations, we execute IDS in the
insiders selected by the approximately optimal algorithm,
MUNEN-MC. We justify this approximation as follows. We
computed an upper bound for the number of insiders covered
by the optimal set of IDS active insiders by relaxing the integer
constraints in . For different topologies this upper
bound exceeds the number of insiders covered by the IDS active
insiders selected by MUNEN-MC only by a small amount.
For example, for , for different values of , the two
numbers differ by at most 4% of the former [25]. In RP, the
expected number of IDS active insiders is . Thus, for even
comparison with the optimal algorithm, we select .
In Fig. 4(a) and (b), we plot the probabilities of detection
measured from simulation and that obtained from the analytical
expressions obtained from Theorem 2 and
the upper and lower bounds for obtained from
Theorems 3 and 4, respectively) as a function of the expected
number6 of IDS active insiders for different values of . For the
upper bound, we select , i.e., the upper bound holds w.p.
0.9. These plots demonstrate that the results obtained from the
simulation and the analysis match closely. For the optimal algo-
rithm, the upper and lower bounds are close indicating that both
are good approximations, and as expected the detection prob-
ability measured in the simulation is between the two bounds.
In Fig. 4(c), we plot the ratio between the expected number of
IDS active insiders of RP and the optimal solution as a function
of the probability of detection. We obtain this ratio from sim-
ulation measurements. Fig. 4(c) shows that for high detection
probabilities, the number of insiders required by RP is signifi-
cantly higher than that by the optimal algorithm. But for low de-
tection probabilities, both algorithms require similar number of
IDS active insiders. Thus, given its low resource consumption,
the optimal algorithm (or its approximation MUNEN-MC) is a
clear choice when systems require very high detection probabil-
ities (e.g., 95%). Given its simplicity, RP is a clear choice for
systems that can accept low detection probabilities. The thresh-
olds for these “low, medium, high” detection probabilities can
be computed from the analytical expressions.
We now explain these observations using the analysis.
For low detection probability, and are both low. Thus,
from (2) and Theorem 4, since and ,
. When the number of
insiders ( ) is large, is a good approximation
for . Thus, at low detection probability, RP
and the optimal have similar performance. For high detection
probability, is high. Hence, as discussed before, unlike the
optimal algorithm, RP selects the IDS active insiders such that
their coverage areas significantly overlap. Therefore, compared
with the optimal algorithm, RP has much smaller increase in
coverage area and, hence, detection probabilities for the same
increase in the number of IDS active insiders. Conversely,
at high detection probability, for equal increase in detection
probability, compared with the optimal algorithm, RP needs to
execute the IDS in many more insiders.
We now allow bad packets to traverse arbitrary number of
hops between the intruder and its target and obtain approxi-
mate results for the probabilities of detection of the attacks for
both the optimal algorithm and RP. We point out the approxi-
mations after each result. We now assume that the insiders are
uniformly distributed in a circle of radius and area . Thus,
, and . The intruder and its target are
uniformly distributed in the circle. Thus, multiple insiders may
6For RP, each insider executes the IDS w.p. q and, hence, n represents the ex-
pected number of IDS active insiders selected by RP. For the optimal algorithm,
n is the exact number of IDS active insiders.
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Fig. 4. In (a), (b), (d), and (e), we plot the probabilities of detection as functions of the number of IDS active insiders for the optimal algorithm (OPT) and RP. We
obtain the data from the simulation and the analysis. In (c) and (f), we plot the ratio of the expected number of IDS active insiders for RP and OPT as a function
of the probability of detection for different values of . In (a)–(c), we consider probability of detection at a uniformly selected insider. In (d)–(f), we consider
probability of detection of an attack when packets traverse multiple hops. All insiders are static. (a) 400 insiders  = 0:087. (b) 400 insiders  = 0:196. (c) 400
insiders. (d) 400 insiders  = 0:11. (e) 400 insiders  = 0:25; (f) 400 insiders.
relay the packets. The rest of the assumptions remain the same.
As before, we approximately compute the probabilities of detec-
tion of an attack for the optimal algorithm
and RP ) as functions of and , respectively,
for any given values of parameters , , (the letter indi-
cates possible multihop transmissions).
Theorem 5:
The approximation here is that we ignore the “edge effects.”
The edge effects arise only for insiders that are at a distance
greater than from the center of the circle. But, the resulting
inaccuracy is negligible when , which is normally the
case.
We now approximate , which is the probability
that an attack is detected when every point in the simulation
area is an insider. As before, we expect
.
Theorem 6:
We now compare the above analytical expressions with mea-
surements obtained using ns2-simulations. Again, the insiders
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Fig. 5. We plot the probabilities of detection as functions of  at different values of n for the optimal algorithm (OPT) and RP. In (a) and (b), we consider
probability of detection at a uniformly selected insider. In (c) and (d), we consider probability of detection of an attack when packets traverse multiple hops. All
insiders are static. (a) OPT. (b) RP. (c) OPT. (d) RP.
Fig. 6. We consider topologies with 100 mobile insiders, and five mobile intruders attacking five destinations. We consider both AODV and DSR routing protocols.
In (a) and (b), we plot the ratio of the expected number of IDS active insiders of RP and GGO-DOM as a function of the probability of detection of an attack when
packets traverse multiple hops. In (c) and (d), we plot the probability of detection of the optimal algorithm and GGO-DOM as a function of the number of IDS
active insiders. (a)  = 0:087. (b)  = 0:196. (c)  = 0:087. (d)  = 0:196.
are distributed as described in the analysis, and .
The rest of the parameters are selected as in the previous sim-
ulation. The route between the intruder and its destination is
selected using two different routing algorithms—AODV and
DSR. Fig. 4(d) and (e) demonstrates that the results obtained
using analysis and simulation match well—the differences are
somewhat more than in the previous case. This is because of
the additional approximations in this case. But, again the dis-
crepancies are not significant. Also, as expected both algorithms
have higher detection probabilities than in the previous case.
This is because the bad packets travel longer paths and are, thus,
more likely to travel through the neighborhood of IDS active in-
siders. Fig. 4(f) shows that the performance difference between
RP and the optimal algorithm is as before. Also, the choice of
the routing algorithm does not affect the detection rate. Finally,
an intruder may send bad packets directly to its target node
without using an intermediate insider as a relay. But, still the
optimal algorithm can attain very high probability of detection
for moderate . This happens because even when is moderate
the intruder is likely to be in the transmission range of some
IDS active insider which detects the bad packets the intruder
transmits.
In Fig. 5, we plot the probability of detection as a function of
at different values of for both algorithms. We consider both:
a) the probability of detection at each insider and b) probability
of detection of an attack. We obtain the plots using the analytical
expressions given in Theorems 2 and 4 [case (a)] and Theorems
5 and 6 [case (b)]. As expected, for both algorithms the proba-
bility of detection at any given increases with increase in .
This is because with increase in each IDS active insider covers
a larger area and, hence, larger number of insiders and, hence, is
more likely to detect bad packets. The plots suggest that for both
algorithms the probability of detection can be approximated by
piecewise linear functions of .
Now, we compare the performance of GGO-DOM and RP
(Section III-C) when all nodes are mobile. Recall that the op-
timal and approximation algorithms (Sections III-A and III-B)
cannot be used in this case as the solutions must be recom-
puted every time an insider moves. We select the probabilities
in GGO-DOM and RP so as to have the desired value of the ex-
pected number of IDS active insiders. We consider topologies
where 100 IDS capable insiders, 5 intruders, and 5 destinations
are uniformly distributed in a square of side 670 m. Each in-
truder launches an attack consisting of ten packets on a separate
destination. Each attack is detected if and only if all packets con-
stituting the attack are received by an IDS active insider. The
probability of detection of an attack is measured as the frac-
tion of attacks that have been detected over all trials. Each node
moves as per the random way point mobility model with max-
imum speed of 20 m/s and pause time 10 s. The routes between
the intruders and the destinations are selected using AODV and
DSR protocols. In Fig. 6(a) and (b), we plot the ratio between the
expected number of IDS active insiders of RP and GGO-DOM
as a function of the probability of detection of an attack. The
plots are similar to those for networks with static insiders, ex-
cept that the difference between the number of IDS active in-
siders of RP and GGO-DOM is little lower than that between
RP and the optimal algorithm. This is because GGO-DOM se-
lects the IDS active insiders from those selected by GO-DOM,
which allows greater overlap among the coverage areas of the
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Fig. 7. Shaded insiders are IDS incapable. Thus, only v , v may be IDS
active. Here, v is a removal insider.
selected insiders than the optimal algorithm. The performance
difference between RP and GGO-DOM can be explained sim-
ilarly as that between RP and the optimal algorithm. We draw
similar conclusions.
We now investigate the number of IDS active insiders se-
lected by the optimal algorithm and GGO-DOM for high de-
tection probability. The simulation parameters are the same as
described in the previous paragraph, except that the insiders
are static here. In Fig. 6(c) and (d), we plot the probabilities
of detection of attacks for these algorithms as functions of the
expected number of IDS active insiders. The figures show that
both algorithms attain probability of detection 0.9 and 1 when
only 15% and 25% of the insiders execute the IDS, respec-
tively. Thus, high probabilities of detection are obtained even
when only a modest fraction of the insiders operate in promis-
cuous mode. In most ad hoc networks, at least a small number
of insiders have significant energy. Thus, even for high detec-
tion probability, it would be sufficient to execute the IDS only
in these insiders.
We finally discuss how the presence of IDS incapable insiders
limit the performance of the optimal algorithm. When some in-
siders are IDS incapable, it may not be possible to have the IDS
active insiders cover all insiders even when . The insiders
that are not covered by any IDS capable insider are denoted as
“removal insiders” (Fig. 7). Specifically, IDS active insiders will
not cover the “removal insiders.”
Lemma 2: Let . Then, the optimal algorithm selects
the IDS active insiders such that they cover all insiders other
than the removal insiders.
Thus, irrespective of the resource used in the detection
process, the bad packets that traverse only the removal insiders
and are generated by intruders not covered by IDS active in-
siders will not be detected. Consider a network with insiders
uniformly distributed in a square of area . Let each insider
cover fraction of the total area, and be IDS capable w.p. . Let
be the number of removal insiders in this network.
We now quantify .
Theorem 7: .
We first present the intuition behind the result. Now,
is the probability that an insider is a removal
insider which equals the probability that all its neighbors are
IDS incapable. Also, is the probability that a
bad packet transmitted by an insider is not detected under RP in
the model, which happens when all neighbors
of the insider are IDS inactive. Note that each insider is IDS
incapable in the former case and IDS inactive in the latter case
with the same probability . The result follows.
Theorems 2 and 7 show that the expected fraction of removal
insiders is a monotonically decreasing function of and . This
is intuitive as with increase in each insider is likely to have
larger number of neighbors and, thus, more likely to have at
least one IDS capable neighbor. In Fig. 8, we plot the expected
fraction of removal insiders as specified in Theorem 7 for several
Fig. 8. We plot the expected fraction of removal insiders as a function of ' for
different values of .
different values of and . We observe that even when each
insider is IDS capable w.p. only 0.3 this expected fraction is less
than 2.3%. Thus, the existence of IDS incapable insiders would
not significantly decrease the probability of detection.
V. RELATED WORK
Ko et al. describe the challenges faced by conventional intru-
sion detection mechanisms when used in ad hoc networks [11].
We now describe some related work in placing the detection
modules which is our focus. Ramanujam et al. [18] advocate the
use of firewalls on every node with the firewalls being config-
ured to contain the list of allowable packet flows. Like us, they
require intermediate nodes to eavesdrop passively. Zhang et al.
[29] also present a distributed intrusion detection and response
framework for mobile ad hoc networks, where every node exe-
cutes the IDS and responds to intrusion. They assume that the
nodes cooperate. The disadvantage of both these schemes is that
they consume significant energy and computational resource
due to involvement of every node in the detection scheme. We
present algorithms that maximize the detection rate, while min-
imizing the resource consumption.
We now briefly describe a few other detection schemes that
do not consider placement of IDS. Marti et al. [14] propose a
cooperative routing scheme for avoiding transmitting packets
through misbehaving nodes. Nodes promiscuously monitor
traffic and cooperate so as to detect and report misbehavior to
other nodes. Michiardi et al. [16] present the CORE mechanism
in which reputation is used to enforce cooperation among nodes
and prevent denial of service attacks. Buchegger et al. [20]
propose the CONFIDANT scheme in which a node monitors
its neighborhood to detect intrusion. When a node detects in-
trusion, it transmits alarm messages to other nodes in its friends
list. Rao et al. [19] propose to detect intruders by observing
node behavior. They propose to estimate the congestion at
intermediate nodes and decide if the intermediate node is not
forwarding packets at the desired rate because of congestion or
because of malicious behavior.
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We now distinguish the intrusion detection problem from the
related coverage problem in sensor networks [12], [21] [28]. The
coverage problem in sensor networks needs coverage of the area
under consideration, while intrusion detection in ad hoc net-
works requires coverage of nodes that transmit the bad packets.
Thus, the former needs appropriate deployment of sensors to
satisfy coverage requirements, while the latter needs appropriate
selection of IDS active nodes given the topology. Furthermore,
the results obtained in both areas also differ. We have analyzed
the probabilities of detection of the optimal node selection al-
gorithms and heuristics for any given value of the transmission
radius and number of nodes . To the best of our knowl-
edge, only few specific sensor deployment algorithms (e.g., grid
deployment, random deployment, etc.) have been analyzed in
sensor networks; also only asymptotic ( and )
coverage probabilities are known for these.
VI. CONCLUSION
We investigate the placement of the intrusion detection
software for misuse detection in ad hoc networks with multiple,
mobile intruders. We mathematically formulate the problem
of maximizing the detection probability subject to consuming
no more than a certain amount of resource. We show that
computing the optimal solution is NP-hard. Thereafter, we
propose two polynomial complexity algorithms, Greedy-MC
and MUNEN-MC, that approximate the optimal solution within
a constant factor, and prove that they attain the best possible
approximation ratio. We develop analytical expressions that
quantify the resource consumed by the optimal and approxi-
mation algorithms and heuristics at different probabilities of
detection. We demonstrate using analysis and simulation that
the optimal and approximation algorithms consume much less
resource for attaining the same probability of detection as com-
pared with a naive algorithm, RP, that randomly places the IDS.
Furthermore, attacks can be detected with high probability,
while using algorithms that are oblivious to the locations and
identities of the intruders and the paths used by them, and while
consuming modest amount of resource. For example, even
for high detection rates (90%–100%), the optimal algorithm
requires only a modest fraction of nodes to execute the IDS,
which can therefore be those that are not limited in energy.
Finally, the framework relies on the assumption that the de-
tector modules are never compromised, which we relax in part
II of this sequel [26]. Promising areas of future research are
the design and implementation of efficient intrusion recovery
mechanisms.
APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1: Refer to [26, Appendix, Sec. E ].
We now state Lemma 3 which holds due to uniform distribu-
tion of insiders. We prove Theorems 2 and 7 using this lemma.
Lemma 3: Let insiders be uniformly distributed in a
square of area . Two nodes are neighbors if and only if
the distance between them is less than or equal to , and
. Consider an insider . Each insider covered by
selects a binary random variable independent of others. Now,
Fig. 9. Shaded areas show the areas E for three different locations of the
selected insider V .
selects 1 w.p. and 0 w.p. . Let be the event that all of
’s neighbors other than select 0
Proof: Refer to Fig. 9. Let denote the event that the
uniformly selected insider is in area , where .
Now, , where
is the conditional probability of the event
given . Now, since is selected uniformly among all in-
siders and the insiders are uniformly distributed in area ,
area of . Thus
(5)
Now, we compute Note that occurs if each of the
insiders other than are either not ’s neighbor or selects
0. Let be the intersection of the square and the circle with
radius and center at ’s location. Any given insider is ’s
neighbor w.p. area of and if it is ’s neighbor it selects 1
w.p. . Thus, area of . Now, when
area of . Thus
(6)
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When area of is
where random variable specifies ’s
location in . Now, random variable is uniformly distributed
in [0, 1]. Thus
When area of is where random variables
and specify ’s location in . Now, random variables and
are independent and uniformly distributed in [0, 1] each. Thus
(7)
The result follows using (5)–(7).
Proof of Theorem 2: Let insider relay the bad packets.
Now, the packets are not detected if is not IDS active and no
other insider covered by is IDS active. These are independent
events. The first happens w.p. . Let the second event be
denoted as . Thus, . Under
RP, each insider is IDS active w.p. independent of whether
other insiders are IDS active. Thus, is given by ( )
in Lemma 3 with . The result follows.
Proof of Theorem 3: Let the desired probability of detec-
tion be . Then, , where is
the number of insiders covered by IDS active insiders selected
by the optimal algorithm. The last equality holds because the
insider that relays the bad packets is uniformly selected. Thus,
. Now, let insiders be IDS active under the op-
timal selection algorithm, where . Then, these
IDS active insiders must cover at least addi-
tional insiders. This can happen only when there exists at least
one set of insiders that cover or more insiders
where . Let this event be denoted as . Now, let
. We show that .
Thus, w.p. at least at least IDS active insiders are
required to attain . This holds for all ,
, for which
and, hence, for
. The result follows.
We now prove that when ,
, then . Let be the event that
insiders in a set cover or more insiders. Now,
. Using union bound
(8)
Now, (8) holds since insiders together cover at most
fraction of the total area, and since insiders are uniformly dis-
tributed, number of insiders in fraction of the total area
is a binomial random variable with parameters , (
Fig. 10. The figure illustrates an algorithm for selecting IDS active insiders
in an area where every point is an insider. The algorithm would execute IDS in
insiders at the positions marked 1, 2, 3, and 4. The circles indicate the coverage
areas of the insiders that are currently executing the IDS.
is the success probability of the binomial distribution). Thus,
for any with cardinality is the tail probability of the
above binomial distribution. The result follows.
Proof of Theorem 4: The bad packets are detected if and only
if the selected insider is the neighbor of an IDS active in-
sider. Thus, since is selected uniformly and every point in the
square is an insider, equals the fraction of the total
area covered by IDS active insiders under the optimal algorithm.
Thus, . The optimal algorithm will select IDS
active insiders so as to maximize the covered area. We propose
a specific coverage process, and thereby obtain a lower bound
for . Refer to Fig. 10. If insiders are selected at
positions marked “1” for executing the IDS, each insider covers
an additional fraction of the total area (shaded area), and in-
siders together cover fraction of the total area. Since
is an even integer, there are such positions. Thus, for
, . For
, insiders at positions marked “2” are selected, and then each
additional insider covers an additional area marked “ ” which
is fraction of the total area. Thus, insiders cover
fraction of the total area.
Thus, for ,
. For
, insiders at positions marked “3” are se-
lected. Each additional insider covers an additional area marked
“ ” which is fraction of the total area. Thus, for
, insiders
cover a fraction
of the total area. For , insiders at po-
sitions marked “4” are selected. Each additional insider covers
an area marked “ ” which is fraction of the total
area. Thus, for , insiders cover
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Fig. 11. The figure shows the intruder I , I’s target D, and relay insiders. The
area marked “ ” is the total coverage area.
fraction of
the total area. These justify the lower bounds for in
these regions.
Proof of Theorem 5: Now, we assume that the intruder (I)
and its destination (D) are uniformly distributed in a circle of ra-
dius . Thus, the distance between them is a random variable
with distribution , where
([22, p. 129]). We assume that the path
between the intruder and its destination constitutes a straight
line. We ignore edge effects, i.e., we assume that irrespective
of a node’s position, it can have neighboring nodes in a circle
of radius around it. If the distance between the intruder and
its destination is less than or equal to , then there is no relay
insider and the attack is detected if there is at least one IDS ac-
tive insider in the intruder’s coverage area which is . If the
distance between the intruder and its destination exceeds ,
then the attack is detected if there is at least one IDS active in-
sider in the coverage areas of the intruder and the relay insiders.
This coverage area is (Fig. 11).
We denote the total coverage area of the intruder and the relay
insiders (if the path has relay insiders) by a function of
the distance between the intruder and its destination. Now, if
the coverage area has at least one IDS active insider with
probability . Thus, the
probability of detection of an attack is
. Substituting the values of and
and substituting with , with and appro-
priately changing the limits of the integration we observe that
the above probability equals the right-hand side expression in
Theorem 5. The result follows. We use the approximation sign,
because we have ignored edge effects.
Proof of Theorem 6: Refer to technical report [25].
Proof of Lemma 2: When , then all IDS capable in-
siders can become IDS active. The optimal algorithm selects
as many IDS active insiders as required to cover the maximum
possible number of insiders. Clearly, a removal insider cannot
be covered by an IDS active insider. If all the IDS capable in-
siders execute IDS, every insider that is not a removal insider is
covered by an IDS active insider, since every such insider has at
least one IDS capable neighbor. The result follows.
Proof of Theorem 7: Let random variable equal 1 if
the th insider is a removal insider, and 0, otherwise. Clearly,
, and for all , . Thus,
. An insider is a removal insider if it
is not IDS capable and no other insider in its neighborhood is
IDS capable. These are independent events. The first happens
w.p. . Let the second event be denoted by . Thus,
. Since each insider is IDS capable
w.p. independent of others, is given by in
Lemma 3 with . The result follows from appropriate
substitution and Lemma 3.
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